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ABSTRACT

One of the constant elements of warfare is its degrading
effects on the environment. Many writers blame this destruction
of the environment on inadequate standards in the
international law of environmental warfare. To remedy this
shortfall, the international law of environmental warfare
should be categorized as either passive or active environmental
warfare. Active environmental warfare requires the intentional
"use" of the environment as a weapon of waging armed conflict.
Passive environmental warfare includes acts not specifically
designed to "use" the environment for a particular military
purpose but that have a degrading effect on the environment.
Passive environmental warfare violates international law only
when it produces effects that are widespread, long-term, and
severe. Active environmental warfare against the sustainable
environment that is not de minimus violates internationallaw
per se and should not require environmental damage to reach
the standard of widespread, long-tasting, and severe to be
considered a violation of international law. A well-recognized
differentiation between active and passive environmental
warfare will help solidify the standards of state responsibility
and provide increasedprotection for the environment.
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And it came to pass, as they fled from before Israel, and were in the
going down to Bethhoron, that the LORD cast down great stones from
heaven upon them unto Azekah, and they died: they were more which
died with hailstones than they whom the children of Israel slew with
the sword.
And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the people had
1
avenged themselves upon their enemies.

I. INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of recorded history, war has played a major
role in shaping the course of events. Though geography changes,
nations come and go, vanquished turn into conquerors, and victors
become victims, one of the constant elements of warfare is its

1.

Joshua 10:11, 13 (King James).
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Concurrent with war's
degrading effects on the environment. 2
deleterious effects on the environment, man has from time to time
inherent in the
attempted to harness the overwhelming powers
3
environment and unleash them on his enemies.
This was graphically demonstrated as recently as the 1991 Gulf
War. The environmental destruction that occurred in that short war
appalled the world 4 ' and set new levels in man's willingness to
destroy his surroundings while waging hostilities.5 Many observers

See Margaret T. Okorodudu-Fubara, Oil in the Persian Gulf War: Legal
2.
Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 123, 128 (1991); see also
Sebia Hawkins, The Gulf War: Environment as a Weapon, Proceedings of the EightyFifth Annual Meetings of the American Society of InternationalLaw, 85 AM. SOC'y INT'L
L. 220, 220 (1991).
See STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WARFARE IN
3.
A FRAGILE WORLD: THE MILITARY IMPACT ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, 14-19 (1980)
[hereinafter SIPRI] (giving an account of the history of environmental warfare); Mark
A. Drumbl, Waging War Against the World: The Need to Move From War Crimes to
Environmental Crimes, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 122, 123 (1998); Laurent R. Hourcle,
Environmental Law of War, 25 VT. L. REV. 653, 654-60 (2001); Okorodudu-Fubara,
supra note 2, at 142; Rymn James Parsons, The Fight to Save the Planet: U.S. Armed
Forces, "Greenkeeping," and Enforcement of the Law Pertaining to Environmental
Protection During Armed Conflict, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 441-42 (1998);
Peter J. Richards & Michael N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the
Environment DuringArmed Conflict, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1047, 1051-54 (1999); Michael
N. Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw and the Environment, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 265,
266-68 (2000) [hereinafter Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw]; Timothy Schofield, Comment,
The Environment as an Ideological Weapon: A Proposal to CriminalizeEnvironmental
Terrorism, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 619, 634-35 (1999); Ensign Florenzio J. Yuzon,
Deliberate Environmental Modification Through the Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons: "Greening" the International Laws of Armed Conflict to Establish an
Environmentally ProtectiveRegime, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POLY 793, 794-96 (1996).
See Richards & Schmitt, supra note 3, at 1054-56; Schmitt, Humanitarian
4.
Law, supra note 3, at 309-11; Jesica E. Seacor, Environmental Terrorism:Lessons from
the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 481, 481-82 (1994); Aaron
Schwabach, Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq: International Law, the Marsh Arabs, and
Environmental Damage in Non-International Conflicts, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 1, 1-2 (2004).
See Mark J.T. Caggiano, Comment, The Legitimacy of Environmental
5.
Destruction in Modern Warfare: Customary Substance over Conventional Form, 20 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479, 479-81; Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental
Damage: New Challenges for InternationalLaw, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 67, 67-68 (1992);
Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, Compensation for Wartime Environmental Damage:
Challenges to International Law after the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 408-10;
Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage DuringArmed
Conflict: A Case Analysis of the PersianGulf War, 137 MIL. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1992). See
generally, Suzanne M. Bernard, Environmental Warfare: Iraq's Use of Oil Weapons
during the Gulf Conflict, 6 N.Y. INT'L. L. REV. 106, 106-09 (1993); Laura Edgerton, EcoTerrorist Acts During the Persian Gulf War: Is InternationalLaw Sufficient to Hold
Iraq Liable?, 22 GA.J. INT'L & COtIP. L. 151, 151-54 (1992); Okorodudu-Fubara, supra
note 2, at 129-32.
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6
expected similar environmental warfare during the 2003 Gulf War,
and there is clear evidence that there were plans to do so that were
7
never executed.
Many writers blame this intended destruction of the
environment on inadequate standards in the international law of
environmental warfare. 8 After the first Gulf War, there was a flurry
of comment on the status of the law. A host of writers urged the
international community to adopt either a new.convention to protect
the environment during times of armed conflict, 9 create a "Green
Cross" counterpart to the Red Cross,' 0 convene an International
Environmental Court,11 or to enforce more strictly existing standards
of international law.1 2 Others argued that the current law was
sufficiently clear and the standards easily applied. 13 Making the
discussion even more difficult is a debate as to whether the damage

6.
Cf. Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw, supra note 3, at 266-68 ("Recognition that
armed conflict encroaches on the environment hardly represents historiographic
epiphany."); see Experts Warn of Environmental Catastrophe, International Law
Violations in Iraq War, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 18, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURNWS File [hereinafter Experts Warn]. But see Aaron Schwabach, Environmental
Damage Resulting From the NATO Military Action Against Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 117, 118 (2000) [hereinafter Schwabach, Environmental Damage] (stating
that like Gulf War I, the environmental damage that occurred in Kosovo was less than
originally anticipated).
7.
See Iraqi Workers Helped Save Southern Wells, US Says, PLArr's OILGRAM
NEWS, Apr. 11, 2003, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
8.
See Hourcle, supra note 3, at 687; Stephanie N. Simonds, Conventional
Warfare and Environmental Protection:A Proposal for InternationalLegal Reform, 29
STAN. J. INT'L L. 165, 187-88 (1992); see generally Nicholas G. Alexander, Airstrikes and
Environment Damage: Can the United States Be Held Liable for Operation Allied
Force?, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 471, 479-81 (2000); Low & Hodgkinson,
supra note 5, at 481-83.
9.
Hawkins, supra note 2, at 220-21; Myron H. Nordquist, PanelDiscussion on
International Environmental Crimes: Problems of Enforceable Norms and
Accountability, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 697, 702 (1997) (calling for a Protocol V to
the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects); Parsons, supra note 3, at 472-74 (discussing Greenpeace's
proposal of a Fifth Geneva Convention).
10.
Seacor, supra note 4, at 519-21.
11.
See Susan M. Hinde, Note, The International Environmental Court: Its
Broad Jurisdictionas a PossibleFatal Flaw, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 727, 727 (2003).
12.
Caggiano, supra note 5, at 123-24; Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 481;
Parsons, supra note 3, at 475-76 (discussing a U.S. Naval War College-sponsored
symposium that concluded "more effective and efficient enforcement of the existing
laws is needed") (internal citation omitted)Sharp, supra note 5, at 55-56.
13.
Richard M. Whitaker, Environmental Aspects of Overseas Operations, ARMY
LAW., Apr. 1995, at 27, 32.
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done during the first Gulf War violated the current international
standard.14
The resilience of the environment over time ought not to excuse
from international accountability military leaders who intentionally
target the environment as a method of warfare. Rather, treatment of
the environment during international armed conflict should be
classified as either active, meaning using the environment as a
weapon, or passive, meaning acts that do not "use" the environment
Active
but have deleterious effects on the environment.
environmental warfare that damages the sustainable environment
should be viewed as a violation of both international law and the law
of war, and it should not require evidence of widespread, long-term,
and severe damage.
This Article will initially discuss the definition of "environment,"
and then divide wartime treatment of the environment into two
The international law of
categories, active and passive.
environmental warfare, including man's attempts to protect the
environment during times of hostilities as well as exclude the
environment as a means of warfare, will be analyzed, and these
protections will be categorized as regulating either passive or active
environmental warfare. The Article will then argue that the current
effects-based analysis, which is described below, is effective only
Active environmental
against passive environmental warfare.
warfare against the sustainable environment that is not de minimus
violates international law per se and should not require
environmental damage to reach the standard of widespread, longlasting, and severe to be considered a violation of international law.
In addition, the paper will discuss the justification of military
necessity and analyze why such a justification can apply only to
Finally, a
passive and not to active environmental warfare.
Convention on the Protection of the Environment During Armed
Conflict will be proposed and explained as a method to proscribe
active environmental warfare. This convention will codify the active
and passive environmental warfare distinction and clarify
of international
for
violations
responsibility
international
environmental law.

14.
See Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 408-14 (discussing how Saddam
Hussein's attacks on the environment during the 1991 Persian Gulf War may not have
met the threshold requirements to violate international law); cf. Schwabach, supra note
6, at 118. But see Sharp, supra note 5, at 48 (stating that the world community has
clearly stated that Saddam's actions were violations of the laws of armed conflict).
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II. THE ENVIRONMENT

Arriving at an acceptable definition of "environment" presents
an initial difficulty in trying to analyze the current state of
international law in the area of environmental warfare. Many
international treaties and conventions have endeavored to define
environment in this context, most with only limited success, 15 and
16
others have avoided the problem by not offering a definition at all.
Scholars have also made attempts in this area with similarly limited
17
success.
One of the most descriptive definitions of environment is found
in the 1977 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military
or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
(ENMOD).18 The ENMOD Convention defines environment as "the
Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere,
or . . .outer space."'19 Although descriptive, this definition provides
little clarity. Based on this definition, it is difficult to imagine any
form of warfare that would not have serious environmental effects,

15.
The 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment refers to the environment as that which "gives man physical
sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social and spiritual
growth." Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, ch. 1,
1, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 48/14/Rev.1 (1972).
16.
See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/122 (1982).
17.
See John Alan Cohan, Modes of Warfare and Evolving Standards of
Environmental Protection Under the InternationalLaw of War, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 481,
485 (2003); Parsons, supra note 3, at 459-60, where the author states:
One might define the environment as the sum total of the components and
constituents of the atmosphere, biosphere, geosphere, hydrosphere, and
lithosphere. Another definition is that the environment is anything not made
by humans. States have been reluctant to expand the definition of environment
to include such things as natural resources, climate modification, biodiversity,
and ecosystems for fear of limiting their military options. The U.S. Council on
Environmental Quality's definition of the environment is "the natural and
physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment."
This definition illustrates the problems of breadth, ambiguity, and circularity
that plague this most basic concept, viz., exactly what are we attempting to
protect.
Id. (citations omitted).
18.
See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 377 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff
eds., 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter LAWS OF WAR].
19.
Id. art. II, p. 380. But, as discussed below, this convention has very limited
application. Thus it can be argued that the definition is so broad only because the
convention has such a narrow application.
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making it equally hard to provide adequate protections for the
20
environment.
One scholar has proposed defining environment as "anything
that is not man-made." 2 1 There may be real utility in this broad
definition in that it may remove the importance of defining the
environment at all. He argues "[tihe only reason for defining
[environment-and environmental damage] more explicitly would be to
attempt to place an absolute limit on environmental damage that
cannot be exceeded by a military commander, '22 an unnecessary
limitation in his view.
These broadly inclusive definitions, and similar definitions in
other multinational documents and writings, reflect the increasing
desire of the international community to broaden environmental
protections in all situations, especially those that are known to be
potentially the most dangerous to the environment.
Compounding the difficulty of applying international legal
regulation to the environment are competing views as to why the
One view, known as the
environment merits protection.
anthropocentric or utilitarian view, is that the environment is worth
protecting only insofar as it provides some benefit to humans. 2 3 The
opposing view is the intrinsic value view, which holds that the
environment is worth protecting as an end in itself, regardless of
potential utility to humans. 24 This intrinsic value view of the
environment, while not generally accepted by nations, would almost

See Betsy Baker, Legal Protectionsfor the Environment in Times of Armed
20.
Conflict, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 351, 364-65 (1993), where, in discussing recent attempts to
have the environment accorded "civilian object" status as a means of providing greater
protection, the author writes, "[tlhese suggestions, however, are hard to implement
because difficulties in defining 'the environment' make it impractical to exclude that
category entirely as a military objective under article 52(2) [of the 1977 Protocol I]"
(citations omitted).
Sharp, supra note 5, at 32.
21.
22.
Id.
See Cohan, supra note 17, at 486.
23.
24.
See id. at 486-87. Cohan goes on to state:
The balancing test under the law of armed conflict (military necessity and
proportionality) may well need to take into account the evolving nature of
environmental concerns. That is, the value of the environment may be greater
now than it was a few years ago. Many think that the traditional notions of
proportionality and military necessity are evolving and leaning more towards
the intrinsic value perspective so that today a higher degree of protection may
be conferred on the environment when it comes to applying balancing tests,
given the international community's heightened recognition of the
environment's unique status.
Id. at 535.
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25
certainly provide greater protections for the environment over time
26
and may be gaining favor.
Despite the inability of the international legal community to
agree on a useful definition of environment, it is clear that the trend
in the international community is to view the environment as a very
broad and inclusive entity. In fact, the lack of definitional precision
seems to be a result of not wanting to narrow the scope of legal
coverage for the environment. 27 Therefore, although a specific
definition may be useful in a general sense, the lack of clarity and
broader coverage of environmental protections it will provide may
prove more valuable over time.

III. PASSIVE AND ACTIVE

ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE

Adopting a broad definition of environment allows extensive
inclusion of wartime acts and their effects on the environment in
analyzing what wartime acts are illegal. Because the environment is
so expansive, virtually all wartime acts will have some effect on the
environment. 28
The difficulty then becomes differentiating the
severity of specific acts and determining which are violations of
international law or the law of war. This is a vital inquiry because
unless an act has repercussions under international law or the law of
war, wartime leaders, such as Saddam Hussein in Gulf Wars I and II,
have little incentive to abide by environmental preservation
requirements.
Under the current application of the law of war, the inquiry is
completely an effects-based inquiry. As will be discussed in detail
below, 29 unless it can be determined that a specific wartime act will
result in "widespread, long-lasting, and severe" damage to the
environment, neither international law nor the law of war is effective
in deterring or sanctioning military leaders who inflict grievous
damage to the environment, regardless of their intentions. This
current state of the law is unacceptable. Not only is it unlikely that
the international community will be able to make such a
determination without the benefit of the passage of time--making a

25.
See Michael N. Schmitt, The Environmental Law of War: An Invitation to
Critical Reexamination, 6 U.S.A.F. ACAD. LEGAL STUD. 237, 238 (1996) [hereinafter
Schmitt, Environmental Law of War].
26.
See Baker, supra note 20, at 351-52.
27.
See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE
ENVIRONMENT 2 (2002).

28.
See Cohan, supra note 17, at 483, where the author lists six main sources of
environmental harm in times of war.
29.
See infra Part IV.B.1.
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timely sanction impossible 3 0 -but the standard relies completely on
the effects of the act on the environment and takes no account for the
31
intention of the actor.
The best way to clarify existing international law and provide
greater legal protection to the environment would be to classify
environmental damage as either passive or active. This classification
would allow for differentiating the severity of international law
violations based on the target of the attack rather than on waiting to
see the effects of the attack and, therefore, provide the international
community the opportunity to determine the intent of the actor and
seek more appropriate remedies for such violations.
Passive environmental warfare includes acts not specifically
designed to "use" the environment for a particular military purpose
but rather that have a degrading effect on the environment. These
wartime acts may be completely unrelated to the environment in
terms of the intent of the parties, yet they still have consequences
that directly affect the surrounding environment.
An example of passive environmental warfare is the use of
While artillery bombardment is not a "use" of the
artillery.
environment, it has secondary environmental effects on as
destruction of plant life, disruption of natural animal habitats, etc.
Another example is the disruption of the natural environment caused
by the mass movement of large military armored vehicles. 32 It is
most likely not the intent of the belligerents to cause environmental
damage in this way. They are not moving their vehicles in order to
damage the environment, but it occurs as a secondary effect of
waging war.
In contrast to passive environmental warfare, active
environmental warfare requires the intentional "use" of the
environment as a weapon of waging armed conflict. Employing the
environment' as an "instrument of warfare" has been defined as "the
use of the environment that might cause damage to the enemy or
interference with an enemy military or combat activity."3 3 This can
occur through the operation of any conceivable instrument, such as
conventional or unconventional weapons, natural forces, or resources.
Excluded from this definition is military action in connection
with existing environmental conditions. For example, launching a
military satellite to track weather information and to advise military

30.
31.
32.
33.

See Cohan, supra note 17, at 495, 503.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
See Okorodudu-Fubara, supra note 2, at 136.
Harry H. Almond, Jr., The Use of the Environment as an Instrument of War,

2 Y.B. INT'L

Instrument].

ENVTL. L.

455,

460

(1991)

[hereinafter

Almond, Environment as
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units so they can avoid possible damage does not rise to the level of
"use" in the foregoing definition. 34
Active environmental warfare includes inducing earthquakes or
other natural disasters, weather manipulation, and climate
modification, 35 where these activities are intentionally conducted to
disrupt enemy movements or to destroy enemy forces.
Other
examples include redirecting waterways or releasing stored water to
flood trafficable areas, 36 seeding clouds to produce rain, setting forest
fires to direct military forces, and fouling internal waters to prevent
movement of forces. 37
In short, active environmental warfare
involves the deliberate harnessing of the environment as an
instrument for conducting hostilities. In this sense the environment
is not just the field upon which war takes place, but instead it is an
actively used tool of war.
Therefore, in active environmental warfare the environment is
the weapon, whereas, in passive environmental warfare the
environment is merely the victim of wartime acts.
The
differentiation between active and passive environmental warfare
becomes significant when analyzing the standards under which a
nation violates international law. The determination of whether a
nation's breach is one of active use or passive result is pivotal in
deciding liability and potential consequences of such a breach. It is
unlikely that warfare can ever be cleansed of its passive effects on the
environment. But to protect the environment from the most serious
dangers, it is essential to eliminate the intentional use of the
environment as a weapon during armed conflict.
This is a key distinction given the events of the past few decades,
including the Persian Gulf Wars. Had the active and passive
differentiation been in place before the environmental destruction of
the 1991 Gulf War, it may have been easier for the international
community to have exacted reparations in line with Security Council
Resolution 687.38 A clear understanding and concrete application of
this differentiation will increase the international community's

34.
Id. at 460-63.
35.
See Sharp, supra note 5, at 51; see also QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI,
UNRESTRICTED WARFARE 15 (FBIS trans. 1999) (describing environmental modification
techniques such as "man-made earthquakes, tsunamis, weather disasters, or subsonic
wave" weapons as "new concept" weapons).
36.
Schofield, supra note 3, at 634.
37.
See Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 409-10.
38.
See Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 412-14 (pointing to the inadequacy
of current international environmental law as a reason Security Council Resolution 687
could not be properly implemented and reparations actually collected); see also
Bernard, supra note 5, at 109-41, for an excellent discussion on the significance of
customary international law in holding Iraq liable for violations and damages during
the Gulf War.
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ability to hold a nation, and its leaders, responsible for specific
damage done to the environment during armed conflict.

IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE

It has become commonplace in the last decade to say that "the
importance of protecting the environment has become increasingly
obvious."3 9 The events of the Persian Gulf Wars have only served to
accelerate that trend. 40 While there are more than 900 treaties that
have provisions dealing with environmental protection, 41 none
attempts to create an integrated approach to environmental warfare
regulation. The following is a brief analysis of the most significant
international law documents that directly or indirectly provide
protections for the environment during war. This analysis will be
divided into two areas: protection of the environment from passive
wartime effects (when the environment is the victim of hostilities),
and prevention of and limitations on active environmental warfare
42
(when the environment is the weapon in hostilities).
A. Passive Environmental Warfare: The Environment as Victim
Attempts to protect the environment from the ravages of war
began much sooner than attempts to limit man's ability to use the
environment as a weapon. Consensus that the natural environment
was a victim of warfare began to solidify in the 1800s, and it started
with the growing commitment that warfare was limited, that
combatants were constrained in their means and methods of
conducting hostilities, and that their right to injure the enemy was
not unlimited. Growing concurrently with that principle was the "no
harm" principle, the idea that one state cannot use or permit the use
of its territory to harm another state. The establishment of these

39.
Whitaker, supra note 13, at 27. See generally, Cynthia G. Wagner, War
Crimes Against Nature, THE FUTURIST, May-June 2003, at 9-10.
40.
United Nations Decade of International Law: Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, U.N. General
Assembly, 48th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 144, at
56-57, U.N. Doc. A/48/269,
56-57 (1993) [hereinafter Environment in Times of Conflict].
41.
Hourcle, supra note 3, at 674-75.
42.
Some commentators have urged that the use of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons should be treated as violations of international environmental law.
See generally Schofield, supra note 3, at 620-22. But these weapons do not actually
"use" the environment as the "instrument of warfare," but rely on the environment for
effective implementation or as a vehicle for deployment. Id. While these weapons do
not fit into the category of active environmental warfare, international law has
proscribed their use through conventional and customary law-therefore not leaving a
gap in protection of the environment, Id. at 625-42.
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general principles led to the development of a number of specific
provisions more focused on the environment and its protections.
1. Limitation of the Right to Injure the Enemy
As international law developed over the centuries, sovereigns
and their military commanders began to place voluntary limits on
their right to conduct warfare. 43 Most of these voluntary limitations
developed because they served a tactical purpose, 44 but others were
based on a moral view of warfare and that some actions were not
right, even in open hostilities. 4 5
Codification of this principle
appeared as early as 1863 in the U.S. Civil War. President Abraham
Lincoln issued General Order 10046 as part of the Army's Lieber Code
that placed a number of restrictions on how the Union Army fought.
These restrictions "strongly influenced the further codification of the
47
laws of war and the adoption of similar regulations by other states"
and were considered representative of the standard rules of war.
With regard to the environment, the Lieber rules restricted the
destruction of property that was not militarily necessary. 48 While
this provision does not specifically refer to the environment, it began
to form the basis for later provisions that would.
On September 9, 1880, the Institute of International Law
published The Laws of War on Land,49 which contained provisions
stating limitations on the ability to injure the enemy and also dealt
with issues concerning public and private property.
This was
followed by the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899,50 which
produced the Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs
of War on Land. 51 The 1899 Hague Convention was followed by the
Second International Peace Conference in 1907, also at The Hague.

43.
Eric C. Krauss & Michael 0. Lacey, Utilitarian vs. Humanitarian: The
Battle Over the Law of War, PARAMETERS, Summer 2002, at 73-74.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3, (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman
eds. 3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS].

47.
See id.
48.
See id. at 6.
49.
See id. at 35. The applicable articles of this manual include Articles 3
(conformity to laws of war), 4 (ability to injure is not unlimited), 32 (pillage, destruction
of private property only if necessity of war), 41 (definition of territorial occupation), 5053 (dealing with public property), and 54-60 (dealing with private property). Id.
50.
This Conference was initiated by Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, with the intent
of "seeking the most effective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real or
lasting peace, and, above all, of limiting the progressive development of existing
armaments" (Russian note of 30 December 1898/11 January 1899). Id. at 49
(introductory text).
51.
Id. at 63. This treaty was signed on July 29, 1899. See id. at 63.
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The states at this conference produced the Convention (IV)
The
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 52
Convention (IV) revised the 1899 Convention (II), leaving it in5 force
3
for all parties who did not sign on to the newer 1907 convention.
Article 2254 of the 1907 Convention mirrors Article 4 of The
Laws of War on Land5 5 and states that "the right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. '56 Article 23,
particularly (e) and (g), continue to provide constraints, even if not
explicit, to environmental damage during hostilities. 57 Article 23(e)
58
disallows any weapons that would "cause unnecessary suffering,"
and Article 23(g) makes it unlawful to "destroy or seize the enemy's
property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war."59
More clearly tied to the environment, Article 55 of Section III
(dealing with the Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile
State), declares:
The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and
usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural
estates belonging to the hostile State and situated in the occupied
country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and
60
administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.

In this sense, "usufruct" means "the right of one state to enjoy all the
advantages derivable from the use of property which belongs to
another state."61

In general, the 1899 Convention (II) and the 1907 Convention
(TV) taken together, with included Regulations, represent the first
major movement in providing legal constraints that also protect the
These two conventions
environment from wartime damage.6 2

Id. at 71-72. Beginning at page 63 is an excellent comparison between the
52.
1899 Hague Convention (II) and the 1907 Hague Convention (IV).
Id. art. 1V.
53.
All applicable references will be to the 1907 Convention (IV), as it is the
54.
most widely ratified and most often quoted. Id.
55.
See id. at 35.
56.
Id. at 82.
57.
Articles 22 and 23 do not specifically mention the environment. But the
principles they espouse underlie the current principles upon which the international
community has built explicit environmental protections. Id.
Id. at 83.
58.
Id.
59.
Id. at 91.
60.
See Sharp, supra note 5, at 11 (quoting James P. Terry, The Environmental
61.
and the Laws of War: The Impact of Desert Storm, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Vol. XLV, No. 1,
at 61 (Winter 1992)).
62.
their true significance (and limitations) for providing protection to the
environment are clearly shown in an article by Major Richard M. Whitaker, an
international law instructor at the Army's school for lawyers. Whitaker, supra note 13.
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represent the base of international environmental warfare regulation
63
and are generally accepted as part of customary international law.
As elements of international custom, they are binding on all states,
64
regardless of whether they are signatories to the Conventions.
Although these authorities do not represent explicit protections for
the environment, they firmly establish that there are some things
that cannot be done, even in war.
2. The "No Harm" Principle
As this limitation on the ability to injure an enemy became more
and more entrenched in international law, concurrent constraints on
states' interactions with each other in peacetime began to develop.
One of the basic principles is reflected in the Trail Smelter
arbitration. 6 5 In this decision, the United States was awarded
damages from Canada because of air pollution that had drifted across
the border. The decision stated what has become a foundation for
much of current international environmental law: "no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another ..."66
This principle was confirmed and extended to a wartime
environment in the Corfu Channel67 case in which the International
Court of Justice held Albania responsible for not warning British

He wrote, "[T]aken together, these rules [The Hague Convention No. IV and
accompanying Hague Regulations] require commanders to balance the importance of a
particular military objective (military necessity) against the potential destruction to
the environment. Id. For example, when the accomplishment of a mission appears
extremely important, the degree of permissible destruction increases." Id. at 32-33.
The fact that the soldier on the ground is taught to balance military interests against
environmental protection is a testament to the value and effectiveness of the Hague
rules.
63.
See Source: Custom, 1 HACKWORTH DIG. § 3, at 15-17 (outlining basic
tenants of customary international law); Simonds, supra note 8, at 188-98; see also
Hans-Peter Gasser, Current Development: For Better Protection of the Natural
Environment in Armed Conflict: A Proposalfor Action 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 637, 638-39;
Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 442-43; Morris, Protection of the Environment in
Wartime: The United Nations General Assembly Considers the Need for a New
Convention, 27 INT'L LAW 775, 780 (1993); Schwabach, supra note 4, at 6-7; Whitaker,
supra note 13, at 33.
64.
See Source: Custom, 1 HACKWORTH DIG. § 3, at 2; see also Caggiano, supra
note 5, at 498-99 (1993) (asserting that customary international law may be preferable
to treaty and convention law because of its wider application [i.e., to non-signatories]
and the lack of a requirement of consent to hold a nation accountable for violations).
65.
Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1949).
66.
Id. at 1965.
67.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4; see Caggiano, supra note 5, at
503 (asserting that the Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel decisions make it clear that
"the world community should not countenance Iraq's military action against the
environment [in Gulf War I]").
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warships that mines had been placed in its territorial waters. The
Court held that it was "every State's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
68
other States.
This principle was expanded in the Lac Lanoux arbitration 6 9 and
the Nuclear Tests case. 70 The environment was directly implicated in
these cases, which not only confirmed the application of the "no
harm" principle to the environment, but also stand for the basic
principle that nations must co-operate in avoiding adverse effects on
their neighbors through a system of impact assessment, notification,
consultation, and negotiation. 7 1 While the significance of these few
decisions should not be over-stated, they represent a clear indication
that customary international law does not allow unilateral
degradation of the environment at the expense of another nation, and
that the "no harm" principle is a firm principle of international
72
environmental law.
Further evidence of the "no harm" principle is found in the 1972
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment.7 3 At the conclusion of the U.N. sponsored
conference, representatives of 103 nations adopted 74 a declaration
expressing their combined understanding of states' roles in this area.
Principle 21 declares:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or

68.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
69.
Lac Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957). France diverted water from
Spain for its own use. Id. While the ICJ found no violation of international custom, it
confirmed the principle that a state cannot arbitrarily cause harm to another state. Id.
70.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253. This case involved Australia
petitioning the Court to keep France from performing nuclear tests that Australia (and
New Zealand) claimed would detrimentally affect the environment. Although the ICJ
never actually ruled on the merits because France unilaterally withdrew its intention
to conduct further tests, the Court did make some findings, including that although a
state maintains its environmental responsibilities even in armed conflict, becoming
party to environmental restrictions does not abrogate the right of self-defense.
Deborah L. Houchins, Extending the Application of the ICJ's July 8, 1996 Advisory
Opinion to Environment-Altering Weapons in General: What is the Role of International
Environmental Law in Warfare?, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 463, 473-74
(2002).
BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 27, at 104-05.
71.
72.
See generally id. at 103 (particularly ch. 3).
See BURNS H. WESTON, ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
73.
AND WORLD ORDER 691 (2nd ed. 1990).

74.

Id. at 943.

160

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 38.'145

control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
75
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

This pronouncement of sovereignty, coupled with the statement of
accompanying responsibility, has become a basis for many
international documents supporting the "no harm" principle, 76 and is
accepted as customary international law. 77 This principle, combined
with the limitation on belligerents during hostilities, has led to a
number of specific provisions affecting the international law of
environmental warfare.
3. Specific Protections for the Environment as a Victim
As states embraced these general principles of environmental
protection, more specific provisions began to appear in customary and
conventional international law. At the Nuremberg trials after World
War II, nine civilian German administrators were tried for carrying
out the Nazi policy of ruthless exploitation of Polish forests. Others
were tried for "massive devastation of the environment. '7 8 Although
the decision by the court was not decisive, the fact that the Tribunal
pursued crimes against the environment is very significant and
represents the first such judicial action resulting from acts on
another state's land during wartime. The influence of the Nuremberg
Tribunals on international law is uncontested 79 and reflects an
international inclination that evidences itself in other international
law documents.
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of 1949 (GCC) 80 has many provisions that

75.
Id. at 694.
76.
Schofield, supranote 3, at 641-42.
77.
Timothy J. Heverin, Comment, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons: Environmentaland HumanitarianLimits on Self-Defense, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1277, 1284 (1997) (the International Court of Justice declares the duty not to do
transboundary harm as customary international law); Aaron Schwabach, Ecocide and
Genocide in Iraq: InternationalLaw, the Marsh Arabs, and Environmental Damage in
Non-InternationalConflicts, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 1, 16-17 (2004).
78.
See Caggiano, supra note 5, at, 486-87; Bernard K. Schafer, The
Relationship Between the International Laws of Armed Conflict and Environmental
Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of Conduct are Permissible During
Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 287, 310-11 (1988-1989).
79.
See Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg),
Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT. L. 172, 248-49 (1947); see also G.A. Res. 95 (I),
U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946), at 1144 (recognizing the principles of the Charter of the
Nuremburg Tribunal as customary international law).
80.
See Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, opened for signatureAug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287, reprintedin
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 495 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed.
1988).
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reflected customary international law of the time but also has many
others that reflected emerging norms in response to the atrocities of
The fourth of four Conventions, this
World Wars I and II.
convention was aimed primarily at the protection of non-combatants,
Article 53 prohibits an
including inanimate non-combatants.
occupying power from destroying "real or personal property.., except
where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
82
Though this represented little actual protection, it
operations." 8'
reflected the attitude of the post-war community that environmental
effects were a consideration in warfare and that potential
degradation to the environment had its limits, even during war.
As acceptance of the 1949 Convention grew, so did the
recognition of the environment as a resource that deserved protection
In 1978, the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva
during war.
Conventions 83 entered into force. Starting where the GCC left off, it
is acknowledged by many as the first specific attempt to protect the
environment during armed conflicts. Article 55 deserves special
attention. Article 55 states:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment
against widespread, long-term, and severe damage. This protection
includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which
are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural
environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the
population.
2.

Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are

prohibited.

84

The duty of care contained in the first sentence of Article 55 is the
current statement of passive environmental warfare regulation.
It is significant to note that the issue here is the effect an act has
on the environment, not the means or methods or even the intention

81.
Id. at 517.
82.
Whitaker, supra note 13, at 27, 30 (Violations of this provision would be
classified merely as a simple breach of the Geneva Conventions unless the damage to
the environment was extensive, an undefined standard in the Conventions or
Commentary:
The distinction between a simple and a grave breach is important. A grave
breach requires parties to the conventions to search out and then either
prosecute or extradite persons suspected of committing a grave breach. A
simple breach only requires parties to take measures necessary for the
suppression of the type of conduct that caused the breach.

Id.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
83.
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 621 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988).
84.
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 83, at 653.
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of the actors. This limitation places a clear, unqualified restriction on
85
military operations, regardless of how that damage might occur.

While lesser damage is permitted, any military operations that would
cause environmental damage of this magnitude are proscribed. This
is in contrast to the rest of the language in paragraph 1 and its
application to active environmental warfare, which will be discussed
below.
In addition to this Article, Article 52 provides protection to
civilian objects; Article 53 protects cultural objects and places of
worship; Article 54 provides protection to objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population, including such things as
agricultural areas and irrigation works; and Article 56 protects works
and installations containing dangerous forces such as dams, dikes,
and nuclear electrical generating facilities.8 6 These provisions of
Protocol I are the clearest statement in conventional law of the
prohibition on passive environmental warfare in which the effects
reach a prescribed intensity.
The World Charter for Nature,8 7 adopted in 1982 by almost88
unanimous consent of the United Nations General Assembly,
proclaimed "principles of conservation by which all human conduct
affecting nature is to be guided and judged. ' '8 9 One of the principles
specifically deals with environmental degradation in times of war and
against degradation caused by
states that "[n]ature shall be secured
90
activities."
hostile
other
or
warfare
The 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment, held
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, reflected many of these same principles
including a particular reference to the environment in times of armed
conflict. 9 1 Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration states:

Richards & Schmitt, supra note 3, at 1064-65.
85.
86.
See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 83, at 652-53.
See World Charterfor Nature, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item
87.
21, U.N. Doc. A/371C.4 (1982); see Parsons, supra note 3, at 457 (stating that "the
normative assertions of the Charter, though not themselves sufficient, build support for
strengthening international law through a comprehensive regulatory framework which
is the outcome of a multinational lawmaking process").
Weston, supra note 73, at 946.
88.
Id. at 742.
89.
Id. at 743.
90.
See Parsons, supra note 3, at 456.
91.
Some states fear that Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, akin to Principle 21 of
the Stockholm Declaration, may lead to an overwhelming liability for all parties
to a conflict. "States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law . . . the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdictions or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction." Interpreted literally, this language imposes responsibility for
environmental damage during armed conflict even when such damage is
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Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development.
States shall therefore respect international law providing protection
conflict and cooperate in its
for the environment in times of armed
92
necessary.
as
development,
further
This statement marks a clear challenge for those nations willing
to embrace it, and it is quoted as authority for requiring compliance
93
with various peacetime environmental rules during armed conflict.
The acts of the Security Council during the 1991 Gulf War may
have "created legal precedent for future armed conflicts." 94 In April
1991, the Security Council passed resolution 687 holding Iraq liable
under international law for "any direct loss, [or] damage, including
95
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources."
Although this liability has not yet been fully implemented, it sets an
important pattern for future responses to similar environmental
96
degradation.
Several other documents have been written by scholars and
jurists that relate to this issue, including the International
Committee of the Red Cross' Guidelines for Military Manuals and
Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed
Conflict97 and the International Law Commission's Draft Code of
98
Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind.
These specific provisions of international law indicate that a
trend in international law and policy is developing and illustrate the
wide acceptance on the national and international level of the
limitations on passive environmental warfare.

justified under the law of armed conflict and humanitarian law, and imposes
responsibility for incidental damage to global resources beyond the jurisdiction
of individual states. Many states are wary of exposing themselves to this type
of liability and would therefore object to the recognition of these provisions as
customary international law.

Id.
92.
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. AICONF./151/26 (Vol.I) (1992).
93.
Government of the Solomon Islands, International Court of Justice:
Advisory Proceedings on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
(Questions Posed by the General Assembly): Written Observationson the Request by the
GeneralAssembly for an Advisory Opinion, 7 CRIM. L.F. 299, 383-84 (1996).
Simonds, supra note 8, at 178.
94.
95.
S.C. Res 687, U.N.S.C.O.R., U.N.Doc. SJRes/687 (1991).
96.
See Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 477-79.
97.
Follow-up to the InternationalConference for the Protection of War Victims,
311 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 230, 231-37 (1996); see also Drumbl,

supranote 3, at 131-32 (discussing the Guidelines).
98.

INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES AGAINST THE

PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND, reprinted in Drumbl, supranote 3, at 140.
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4. Conclusion
Passive environmental warfare, including wartime acts not
specifically designed to use the environment for a particular military
purpose but that have a degrading effect on it, is constrained by both
treaty and convention and also by customary international law. The
principles mentioned above exhibit a clear trend toward providing
greater protections for the environment from passive environmental
In fact, a review of existing conventional law at the
warfare.
Proceedings of the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law (Thursday, April 18, 1991), led Paul
Szasz to assert, "I think it can safely be concluded that the principle
expressed in all these instruments-that nature is no longer fair
game in mankind's conflicts-is well on its way to becoming an
accepted principle of international law." 9 9
Further, the defining statement on prohibited passive
environmental warfare is found in Protocol I, placing on commanders
the responsibility to protect the environment from any warfare effects
that will result in widespread, long-term, and severe impacts on the
environment. The conjunctive nature of this standard mitigates its
precision in application and allows a significant amount of passive
environmental damage. Although this standard is not very precise, it
is clear enough for the commander as he analyzes his proposed
military operations. As with the Hague Conventions, 0 0 in most cases
the fact that the standard is raised and the commander must be
aware of it is adequate to provide sufficient protections from passive
environmental warfare effects.
B. Active Environmental Warfare: Environment as Weapon
Along with the harm on the environment caused by hostilities, it
is increasingly possible with developing technology to use the
environment as a weapon. This transforms the environment from the
surroundings in which man fights, into a tool by which he fights.
This type of warfare is particularly appealing in a world of military
asymmetry ° 1 in which those countries with limited technological

99.
Paul Szasz, The Gulf War: Environment as a Weapon, 85 PROC. AM. SOC'Y
INTL'L L. 214, 217 (1991).
100.
See Sharp, supra note 5.
101.
Asymmetric warfare occurs when a state, weak in a traditional reading of
military strength, develops a capability that off sets its inferior position. See Ryerson
Christie, Homeland Defence and the Re/Territorializationof the State, available at
http://www.cda-cdai.calsymposia/2002/christie.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2004).
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means are looking for any way to counter their shortfalls.' 0 2 In
contrast to passive environmental effects, actively using the
environment as a weapon requires an element of intent on the part of
the manipulator. Active use cannot occur through a negligent act. It
is only triggered by a purposeful use of the environment as a means
of waging war. This possibility of harnessing the environment and
using it for such active military purposes is drawing increasing
03
attention at the international level.'
1. International Law and Active Environmental Warfare
Although history is not without record of active environmental
warfare, 0 4 using the environment as a means of war is a fairly new
technological development. Further, the distinction between active
and passive use of the environment has not been previously
recognized. Therefore, international law is less developed in this
area. It is possible, however, to conclude that since only a few
nations actively use the environment to carry on warfare, the
requisite state practice exists to establish an international customary
norm.1 0 5 On the other hand, many argue that analyzing what actions
states have not taken is a flawed approach and does not result in a
binding principle of international law without a greater show of
acceptance by states. 0 6 These dissenters would require some overt
act to confirm the state-practice element, rather than relying solely
on non-derogation.

102.
Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 409-12 (discussing how Saddam
Hussein's attacks on the environment during the 1991 Persian Gulf War may have
been attempts to counter the Coalition's advanced weapons technology); see also
Hourcle, supra note 3, at 675 n.105; Schofield, supra note 3 (discussing the use of the
environment as a weapon as an increasingly inviting option to terrorists).

103.
See The Exploitation of the Environment as a Weapon in Times of Armed
Conflict and the Taking of PracticalMeasures to Prevent Such Exploitation, U.N. GAOR
6th Comm., 46th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 140, U.N. Doc. A/46/693 (1991).
104.
See supra note 3.
105.
In the Case of the S.S "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A), No. 9.,
the Permanent Court of International Justice dealt with the question of whether the
abstinence from committing some act created an international norm. This is often
termed the negative approach to international lawmaking. The Court, in this case,
decided that it did not.; See also, Parsons, supra note 3, at 482 (discussing proving the
existence of customary law by establishing that states refrain from taking a certain
action); Aaron Schwabach, Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq: InternationalLaw, the Marsh

Arabs, and Environmental Damage in Non-International Conflicts, 15 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 20 (2004).
106.
See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 114-16 (Burns H. Weston, et
al. eds., 2d ed. 1990)
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Recently, several wars, 10 7 beginning with the Vietnam War and
continuing with the Gulf Wars, have raised the international
community's awareness of the issue, and states have begun to take
overt steps and establish conventional legal constraints on active
environmental warfare.' 0 8 The most significant of these as they
apply to active environmental warfare are the ENMOD and the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflict (GPI). Although neither of these documents was formulated
with the benefit of the distinction between active and passive
environmental warfare, they contain the underlying principles that
have ripened into this vital distinction. Therefore, an analysis of
these two documents and the interaction between them is vital to
understanding the rules regarding active environmental warfare.
On December 10, 1976, the United Nations adopted General
Assembly Resolution 31/72, which later became the ENMOD
Convention.'0 " The ENMOD convention was created in response, at
least partially, to the unsuccessful attempts of the United States to
use weather modification techniques as a weapon in the Vietnam
War." 0
This convention represents the foundation document
regulating the "active" use of the environment in warfare."'
It
"regulates the use of the environment as a means to wage war, rather
11 2
than damage to the environment as an ancillary result of war."
Article I of the convention states:

107.
See Cohan, supra note 17, at 487-88 (discussing the various methods of
environmental warfare used during the Vietnam war and the public outcry that
resulted).
108.
See The Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of the
Environment in Times of Armed Conflict U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Annex Agenda Item
144, U.N. Doc. A148/269 (1993); Conference, A "Fifth Geneva Convention" on the
Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict (co-sponsored by the Centre
for Defence Studies, Greenpeace International, and the London School of Economics) on
June 3, 1991, in London; and Conference of Experts on the Use of Environment as a
Tool of Conventional Warfare (sponsored by Canada and held in Ottawa) in July, 1991;
cf. Schmitt, Environmental Law of War, supra note 25, at 317 (discussing evolving
standards of environmental consciousness). But see Gasser, supra note 63, at 638
(asserting that only GPI, CCW, and ENMOD apply any real safeguards for the
environment during armed conflict).
109.
See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 18, at 379.
110.
See Schmitt, Environmental Law of War, supra note 25, at 239; STOCKHOLM
INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE

ENVIRONMENT 59 (1977).
111.
See Schmitt, supra note 25, at 260-61.
112.
See Cohan, supra note 17, at 524 (asserting that it is generally agreed that
Iraqi actions during the Gulf War would not have violated ENMOD even if Iraq had
been a party to it because the environment was not used as a "weapon."); Simonds,
supra note 8, at 185-86; Whitaker, supra note 13, at 36-37; cf. Yuzon, supra note 3, at
804-05 (discussing pre-ENMOD studies concerning potential environmental targets to
be covered by the Convention).
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1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in
military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the
113
means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.

This provision sets up a two-part test for falling within the
restrictions of the Convention: (1) there must be an intentional
environmental modification technique 114 and (2) widespread, longlasting, or severe effects resulting from that modification. The first of
these elements requires that the offending nation use "deliberate
manipulation of natural processes," 115 not that environmental
damage is simply a result of the action. 116 As stated above, this
requirement of intent is one of the key issues in "active"
environmental warfare.
The second requirement is that the damage is of a certain type
and duration. The words "widespread," "long-lasting," and "severe"
are given more specific meaning in the first Understanding to the
Convention:
It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the purposes
of this Convention, the terms "widespread", "long-lasting", and
"severe" shall be interpreted as follows:
(a) "widespread": encompassing
hundred square kilometers;

an area on the scale of several

(b) "long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approximately a
season;
(c) "severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm to
human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.
It is further understood that the interpretation set forth above is
intended exclusively for this Convention and is not intended to

113.
114.

See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 18, at 379.
See Cohan, supra note 17, at 512.

The Understanding refers to "earthquakes, tsunamis; an upset in the ecological
balance of a region; changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones
of various types, tornadic storms); changes in climate patterns; changes in
ocean currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer; and changes in the state
of the ionosphere." This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustivethus, the use of techniques producing other phenomena could also be
appropriately included, such as volcanic eruptions, tectonic plate movements,
sea level changes, lightning, hail, and changes in the energy balance of the
planet.
Id.
115.
Id. at 380, art. II.
See Laura Edgerton, Eco-Terrorist Acts During the Persian Gulf War: Is
116.
InternationalLaw Sufficient to Hold Iraq Liable?, 22 GA. J. INTIL & COMP. L. 151, 172
(1992) (arguing that the first of these two elements was not met, making it impossible
to hold Iraq responsible under current international law).
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prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms if used in
11 7
connection [sic] with any other international agreement.

The importance of this Understanding is clearer when compared with
similar language in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Convention. Despite the similarity, it is clear that these
linguistic interpretations apply only to ENMOD, not to Protocol J,118
and set a more stringent limitation when conducting active
environmental warfare.
Protocol I has two key provisions," 9 Article 35 and Article 55,
that deserve special attention. Article 35 states:
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the armed conflict
to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering.
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and
120
severe damage to the natural environment.

By placing subparagraph 3 in the same Article as the wellestablished subparagraph 1, the Protocol raises the restraint on
wartime environmental damage to a new level. Further, Article 36
obligates parties to ensure any new means or methods of warfare
121
comply with existing international norms.
Article 55, which has been discussed earlier in connection with
passive environmental warfare, states:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment
against widespread, long-term, and severe damage. This protection
includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which
are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural
environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the
population. 122

There is some discussion as to whether the provisions of Articles
35(3) and 55(1) apply to non-conventional warfare only, but this is
123
not the case.

117.
See LAWS OF WAR, supranote 18, at 377-78. But see Yuzon, supra note 3, at
806-09 (stating that not all states accepted these interpretations).
118.
Richards & Schmitt, supra note 3, at 1064-65.
But see Cohan, supra note 17, at 518 (arguing that Protocol I "contains
119.
prohibitions on damaging, as opposed to using, the environment").
See LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 46, at 644-45
120.
121.
Id. at 645.
122.
Id. at 653.
123.
See Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 427-28 (stating that the consensus
among writers is that the Articles do not apply to conventional warfare).
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Trying to come to a common understanding of the law when
comparing Articles 35(3) and 55 is difficult. 124 It appears that these
two provisions, which seem to take different approaches, and hence
lead to different results, may have been an attempt to satisfy both
the intrinsic value and anthropocentric views of the environment. 125
Article 35 takes an intrinsic value approach 126 to environmental
protection, not tying the protections to any value the environment
provides to man. In contrast, Article 55 appears to take the same
methodology in its passive environmental approach in the first
sentence, but then allows for a de minimus exception to the intrinsic
value approach when discussing the knowing or intentional use of the
environment. 127 This de minimus exception appears to embrace the
anthropocentric view of environmental protection, at least in terms of
active environmental warfare. The confusion caused by applying the
standard of "which are intended, or may be expected" to the
quantitative limitation of Article 35 and the qualitative limitation of
Article 55 is resolved when properly analyzed under the principles of
passive and active warfare.
As previously stated, the first sentence of Article 55 states the
standard for passive environmental warfare. Any military operations
must not have the passive results of such significant environmental
degradation. The second sentence is encompassed by the prohibition
on active environmental warfare. While it does not specifically deal
with using the environment in the same terms as the ENMOD, an
analysis of this provision provides the same results, leaving the de
minimus exception for active actions that do not affect the
sustainable environment.
To clarify, the second sentence to Article 55 appears to be a
prohibition on targeting the environment rather than "using" the
environment as the definition of active environmental warfare
requires. But beginning with the assumption that the environment is
a civilian object, 128 it is inherently illegal to target the environment
unless it becomes a military objective by its nature, location, purpose,

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Richards & Schmitt, supra note 3, at 1060-62.
Id. at 1062.
Id.; see supra notes 22-23.
Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw, supra note 3, at 313-14.
See id. at 262.

[E]nvironmental protection represents a new value, particularly when one
moves beyond a purely anthropocentric perspective. If the law is to adequately
adapt, it must recognize the uniqueness of the environment. To date, there is
little evidence that is being done. Instead, the environment is usually treated
as merely another civilian object.

170

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38:.145

or use, and there is a military necessity to attack. 129 Assuming a
commander can establish the military necessity to do so, he must still
be able to show that the targeted portion of the environment meets
the nature, location, purpose, or use test.
By its nature, the environment is not a military objective.
Things such as weapons, equipment, transports, fortifications, and
depots are military objects by their nature.' 30 The environment does
not meet this definition. Nor could it be considered by its nature to
be a "dual-use" target, one which serves both military and civilian
purposes, as there is nothing intrinsic in the environment to make it
such.
Location requires a different analysis. These are objects that
by their nature have no military function but which, by virtue of their
location, make an effective contribution to military action. This may be,
for example, a bridge or other construction, or it could also be ... a site
which is of special importance for military operations in view of its
location, either because it is a site that must be seized or because it is
important to prevent the enemy from seizing it, or otherwise because it
13 1
is a matter of forcing the enemy to retreat from it.

It could certainly be that the movements of an enemy might make a
commander consider attacking a portion of the environment based on
the location of the enemy. For example, Saddam Hussein's lighting of
oil wells in the first Gulf War to create a thick cloud of smoke to cover
his retreat could possibly be justified under the location analysis of
Article 52.132 As stated earlier, however, causing damage to the
enemy or interference with an enemy military or combat activity by
using the environment turns the environment into an instrument of
warfare and is active environmental warfare.1 33 Hussein's targeting
of the environment based on its location was really an active use of
the environment because it was intended to have a direct effect on his
enemy's combat activities.
Purpose is generally "concerned with the intended future use of
an object"'1 4 and would include such things as targeting buses that
were on their way to military barracks to pick up troops and carry
them to the front lines. For example, Hussein's fouling of the waters
to prevent a potential amphibious landing is an attack on the

129.

See LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 46, at 652.

130.

See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE

GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949,

2020 (S. Pictet et al. eds., 1958) [hereinafter

COMMENTARY].

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 2021.
See LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 46, at 652.
See Almond, Environment as Instrument, supra note 33.
See COMMENTARY, supra note 130, at 2022.
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environment based on the purpose to which the environment was
135
going to be used.
Finally, intentionally targeting the environment may be based
on its use by the enemy. The typical example of this is targeting
forests or jungles that provide cover and concealment of enemy troop
movements. Again, this type of attack is active environmental
warfare because it causes damage to the enemy or interference with
an enemy military or combat activity.
Therefore, intentional targeting of the environment, a civilian
object, is in fact a "use" of the environment and fits within the
definition of active environmental warfare. Such targeting should
therefore be prohibited unless it is de minimus, meaning it will not
affect the health or survival of the population or damage the
sustainable environment.
This still leaves a discussion of Article 35.3 of the Protocol I,
which prohibits "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage
to the natural environment. '136 Article 35's intrinsic value approach
is laudable in principle but has been a significant contributor to the
inability to enforce environmental standards. The Article's complete
prohibition on active warfare actions only when they reach a
quantitative level of damage provided a good basis upon which to
build in 1977, but it has not produced sufficient clarity to provide the
necessary deterrence or enforcement. The law of environmental
warfare must take a step forward and remove the quantum portion
13 7
when active environmental warfare is contemplated.
Continuing the comparison of Articles 35 and 55, it is significant
that the Protocol lists the terms "widespread, long-term, and severe"
in the conjunctive, meaning that all three requirements must be
satisfied for a breach of the Protocol, causing some commentators to
argue the destruction in World Wars I and II "would not have met
this threshold requirement. i13 8 In contrast, the disjunctive 139 nature
of the same terms in the ENMOD Convention illustrates the lower
threshold of damage required to constitute a breach when dealing

135.
136.
137.
the crime
regardless

Cf. Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 408-10.
See LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 46, at 645.
See Yuzon, supra note 3, at 841 (arguing that adding an intent element to
of environmental modification could make any degree of damage a crime,
of whether it was widespread, long-term, or severe).

138.
See CLAUDE PILLOUD, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA

CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AT 390-91 (Yves Sandoz ed., 1987) quoted in
Whitaker, supra note 13, at 38.
139.
See Schwabach, supra note 6, at 22.
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with the "active" use of the environment in warfare. 140 This lower
threshold of needing to satisfy only one of the elements will result in
a violation of international environmental law at a much earlier
stage of damage and will provide added protection to the
environment.
Further, the meaning given to the terms "widespread, long-term,
and severe" are also more relaxed than those of the ENMOD.
Most experts agree with the commentary to GPI, which states that
"long-term" should be measured in decades (twenty to thirty years).
Although the other two terms remain largely subject to interpretation,
a number of credible interpretations have been forwarded. Within GPI,
the term "widespread" probably means several hundred square
kilometers, as it does in the ENMOD Convention. While "severe" can
be explained by Article 55's reference to any act that "prejudices the
' 14 1
health or survival of the population."

It is important to remember that despite the lower threshold for
damage, the ENMOD convention also requires that the acts be
intentional, a threshold requirement of active environmental warfare.
The ENMOD Convention, although somewhat unique in its
terms, represents the starting point for future active environmental
warfare conventions and treaties. Its clear prohibition of wartime
environmental modification techniques represents a significant
stepping stone, moving the international community in the direction
of greater environmental protection.
In 1992, the Second Review Conference of the ENMOD
Convention answered some significant questions concerning the
interpretation of the ENMOD Treaty. First, and most significant to
this Article, the Conference determined that it did not matter
whether the "damage" resulted from the technique that affected the
modification or was caused by the environmental modification itself.
Second, the Conference clearly stated that herbicides fall within the
42
proscriptions of the ENMOD.'

See Almond, Environment as Instrument, supra note 33, at 135 (writing
140.
that "environmental regulation against the damaging impacts of warfare is tantamount
to taking at least some measures to protect the environment from being part of the
arena of warfare. The extent and duration of protection needed may vary substantially,
and perhaps inversely, with the destructive potential of warfare.") (emphasis added);
Harry H. Almond, Jr., Strategies for Protecting the Environment: The Process of
Coercion, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 295, 339 (1992) (writing concerning these two similar
provisions: "[t]he standard applied [in the 1977 Geneva Protocols] is similar to that of
the ENMOD Convention except that the term 'and' is used rather than 'or' as to the
identification of damage so that the damage that falls within the prohibition [of the
1977 Geneva Protocols] would be larger than that controlled by the ENMOD
provisions.").
Whitaker, supra note 13, at 38 (citations omitted).
141.
See Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 432-33.
142.
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Although both the ENMOD and Protocol I seem reasonably clear
when analyzed on their own, a combined analysis leads to some grave
ambiguity. 14 3 Given the trend toward increasing environmental
protection, this recognized ambiguity is unhelpful and should be
resolved.
Some commentators have already urged that the
"widespread, long-lasting, and severe" standard be discarded and a
strict liability standard be applied. 144 It is not unreasonable to
advocate changes to terms that were molded almost thirty years ago
at a time when warfare's effects on the environment were not so
potentially catastrophic. Applying these well-known standards to the
differentiation of active and passive warfare will resolve this
ambiguity, allowing military commanders to understand the
standard and apply it while conducting military operations.
By applying the quantum limitation on environmental damage
to only passive environmental damage, commanders still must
consider the environmental repercussions of all military operations.
On the other hand, by removing the quantum portion from active
environmental warfare, commanders cannot justify weaponizing the
environment by claiming limited effects. Rather than a quantitative
analysis, the qualitative analysis of damage to the sustainable
environment is the appropriate examination when the environment is
used to accomplish military purposes.
In addition to the ENMOD and Protocol I, there are other
international agreements and pronouncements that deal with active
environmental warfare.
While less significant, they provide an
indication of the path the law is taking. The 1981 Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional

143.
Numerous commentators have drawn their own conclusions concerning the
similarities and differences of these two articles. See Cohan, supra note 17, at 504
arguing that:
Article 35(3) sets forth a defining limit based on concern for the environment
qua environment, conferring an intrinsic value principle on the environment,
without regard to other considerations, while Article 55(1) adds a clause that
takes into account the extent to which the widespread, long-term, and severe
environmental damage will impact the population, thus suggesting an
anthropocentric approach ....
Apparently, this ambiguity was an intentional
feature of Protocol I in an effort of the drafters to appease two competing
camps, those who supported the intrinsic value theory and those who believed
the environment should be evaluated principally based on anthropocentric
considerations and who therefore sought to model the provision in terms of
human harms.
Id.; Richards & Schmitt, supra note 3, at 1061-62; Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw, supra
note 3, at 276 (arguing that article 35(3) "requires that the damage be caused by a
method or means of warfare and imposes a scienter/intent requirement" while Article
55 takes the same approach but only applies when the environmental damage affects
humans).
144.
See Cohan, supra note 17, at 521-22.
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Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
have Indiscriminate Effects 145 (CCW) and some recent actions by the
United Nations and other organizations are worthy of review.
The CCW and its additional Protocols restrict the use of
inhumane weapons. 146 Protocol 11147 of this convention, which
concerns prohibitions and restrictions on the use of incendiary
weapons, is particularly on point. Article 1 contains definitions, and
Article 2 contains a specifically applicable provision:
4. It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the
object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural
elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other
148
military objectives or are themselves military objectives.

Although this provision is weakened by the applicable exceptions of
cover, etc., it is significant in the type of weapons that it
encompasses. The key is that it protects a specific portion of the
environment from a particular type of weapon. While carving out
only a very small area, Protocol III illustrates that the international
community realizes that the combined standards of ENMOD and
Protocol I did not go far enough to protect the environment from
active environmental warfare.
This realization that ENMOD and Protocol I were insufficient
was also clearly demonstrated in the aftermath of Gulf War I. In
response to the destruction of the first Gulf War, some nations
resorted to overt acts (and sought them from others) to try and
remove the doubt as to the existence of international law in the area
of active environmental warfare. For example, Jordan proposed that
the forty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly
(1991) consider the "[e]xploitation of the environment as a weapon in
times of armed conflict." 149 Although the scope of this suggestion was
later broadened to include general protection for the environment in
times of war, 150 much of what came from the efforts of the United
Nations Sixth Committee' 5 ' and further consideration by the United

145.
See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 18, at 473 (discussing its impacts on
international environmental law); Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw, supra note 3, at 287-90
(discussing the history and the provisions of the convention).
It is often termed the Inhumane Weapons Convention. See Simonds, supra
146.
note 8, at 177-78.
147.

See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 18, at 484.

148.
Id. at 485.
Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the ProvisionalAgenda of
149.
the Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/46/141 (1991).
Morris, supra note 63, at 776.
150.
151.
Exploitation of the Environment as a Weapon in Times of Armed Conflict
and Taking of Practical Measures to Prevent Such Exploitation, U.N. GAOR 6th
Comm., 46th Sess., Agenda Item 140, U.N. Doc. A/46/693 (1991).
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Nations General Assembly 152 directly affects on active environmental
warfare. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) raised again the call for greater clarification between the
previously mentioned provisions of the ENMOD Convention and
Protocol 1153 prohibiting environmental destruction that is
widespread, long-lasting, and/or severe.
This response to recent developments and the prolific discussion
in academic journals, as well as at least ten meetings of experts in
the field, 154 provide ample evidence that this is an area of deep
concern in international law. More clarification and increased action
can be expected in the future and is needed for the standard of
environmental protection to be sufficient.
The recent adoption of the Rome Statute and formation of the
International Criminal Court 155 provided an opportunity to resolve
some of this ambiguity and clarify wartime environmental
protections. 156 Unfortunately, that opportunity was missed. The
Rome Statute criminalizes active environmental warfare by making
intentional infliction of harm to the environment a "war crime," but it
is prosecutable only if it is done as "part of a plan or policy or as part
of a large-scale commission of such crimeo."'1 57 Further, the Rome
Statute follows Protocol 1158 with no additional definition of the
1 59
elements of "widespread, long-term, [and] severe."'
Although not nearly as exhaustive as passive environmental
warfare documents, the ENMOD Convention, Protocol I, the CCW,

152.
See G.A. Res. 47/37, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 136, at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/47/37 (1992).
153.
See Environment in Times of Conflict, supra note 40, 2.
154.
See Baker, supra note 20, at 351 n.4; Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw, supra
note 3, at 266-68 (outlining many of the scientific predictions of calamity that would
result from Saddam Hussein's actions in the Gulf War that never materialized);
Experts Warn, supra note 6; c.f Alexander, supra note 8, at 479-80; Schwabach, supra
note 6, at 118.
UNITED NATIONS, ROME STATUTE OF THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT art.
155.
8(2)(b)(iv), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9th (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
statute/romefra.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) (although the U.N. Secretariat initially
served as Secretariat of the International Criminal Court, the Court voted on
September 12, 2003 to establish the Permanent Secretariat of the Assembly of States
Parties to the Rome Statute, which assumed its role on January 1, 2004). For a broad
analysis of the Rome Statue and its impact on environmental warfare, see Drumbl,
supra note 3, at 122.
156.
Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw, supra note 3, at 281-82.
157.
Drumbl, supra note 3, at 124-25.
158.
Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw, supra note 3, at 281-83.
159.
UNITED NATIONS, PREPARATORY COMM'N FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT
FINALIZED DRAFT TEXT OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, art. 8(2)(b)(iv), U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/I/Add.2 (2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
iccelementsofcrimes.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2004); see Drumbl, supra, note 3, at 12930 (arguing that the definitional difficulties of the term may make it more effective to
reduce the standard to mere "harm").
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and the Rome Statute set the baseline and create some conventional
law standards for active environmental warfare, both as to the mens
rea of the parties and as to the resulting effects. The effectiveness of
these documents in controlling environmental warfare has been
limited, however, and has caused at least some commentators to
conclude that they fail to provide "an unambiguous, cohesive
approach to the international problem of wartime environmental
destruction." 160
There is a need for additional clarification,
particularly in the area of active environmental warfare, if the
environment is to be meaningfully protected during times of armed
conflict.
For example, even though Saddam Hussein's actions did not
violate the ENMOD convention, they certainly violated the "intended
or may be expected" standard of Protocol I. There is no doubt that
Hussein intended to cause environmental harm. But as many
commentators have concluded, 161 it is far from agreed that Hussein's
actions violated international law or the law of war, despite his
intentional destruction of the environment because of the quantum of
damage requirement. Whether or not he is an "eco-criminal," the
world's reaction was insufficient to prevent him from engaging in
16 2
similar activities again.
Despite the world's inability to deter Hussein, there is "strong
indicia of a general and consistent practice among states [of]
prohibiting ecological warfare, and of acceptance by signatory states
of a legal obligation to refrain from attacking the natural
environment."' 1 63 The shortage of modern treaty or convention law,
the corresponding scarcity of international custom, and the fluid
nature of international law generally make coming to a precise
conclusion concerning the current status of the law in the area of
active environmental warfare problematic. The disjunctive wording
of the ENMOD Treaty, however, provides strong evidence that a
lower threshold of action is allowed when active environmental
warfare is at issue.
Further, the recent trends illustrated by the work of the ICRC
and the United Nations provide an indication that world opinion is
strongly opposed to any use of the environment as a weapon during
hostilities. That there has been neither derogation from the ENMOD
convention to present day by its signatories nor any act that would be
considered a violation by non-signatories (continuing arguments
concerning Iraq's actions excepted)--and that many recent treaties

160.
161.
162.
163.
During the

Richards & Schmitt, supra note 3, at 1073.
See supra note 14.
See supra note 9.
Suzanne M. Bernard, Environmental Warfare: Iraq's Use of the Oil Weapon
Gulf Conflict, 6 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 106, 113 (1993).
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and conventions attempt to codify such a principle-indicates that a
customary norm against active environmental warfare now exists.
2. Military Necessity
Even if the law of environmental warfare were clear, some have
argued that the environment would still not be sufficiently protected
because of the doctrine of military necessity 16 4 (as found in the 1907
Hague Rules), which requires a commander to balance destruction of
the environment, along with other property, against the military
necessity of the action. 165 A commander may destroy civilian
property, including the environment, only if he deems there is a
sufficient military purpose. In fact, this doctrine is so fundamental to
military operations that one commentator has stated "[ojnly one
obligation in the law of war actually relates to the environment: The
prohibition on the destruction of enemy property that is not justified
by military necessity."'1 66 Others argue, "[m]ilitary necessity has ...
become the main justification for deviation from restrictions in
customary law .... While a number of principles relate to protection
of the environment during warfare, they are all subordinated to the
1 67
principle of military necessity."'
Historically, military necessity has been used to justify attacks
against the environment. For example, military necessity was used
to justify attacks on dams in North Korea but to preclude attacks on
others. 168 Some argued that Saddam Hussein used military necessity
as his justification for intentionally destroying the environment in
Gulf War 1. 1 69
Detractors of the military necessity doctrine,
particularly as it relates to protections for the environment, argue
"[iJf there is no information in [the commander's] consciousness about
the potential environmental effects of his or her action, how can he or
she be expected to validly use a military necessity balancing test? If

Schwabach, supra note 6, at 134.
164.
Whitaker, supra note 13, at 32-33.
165.
Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 414 (citations omitted).
166.
167.
GURUSWAMY ET AL., INT'L ENVTL. LAW AND WORLD ORDER 1069 (1999),
quoted in Arkin et al., On Impact: Modern Warfare and the Environment - A Case
Study of the Gulf War 116, 123 (1991), reprinted in Cohan, supranote 17, at 531-32.
168.
See Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins
and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 229 (1998)
(stating that U.S. and U.N. forces in the Korean War would only authorize the bombing
of dams as a "military necessity" when the result would cut off communications and not
food production).
169.
Id. at 231 (rejecting Iraq's use of "environmental terrorism" as an exercise
of military necessity); Sharp, supra note 5, at 46 (stating "The Deputy Legal Advisor of
the Department of State stated that the principle of military necessity 'was repeatedly
and wantonly violated by Iraq in the Gulf War"').
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one side of the balance is always perceived as zero, the scale will
170
always tip in the other direction-military necessity."
Compounding the problem, "the risks of normative imprecision
grow when retroactive judgments on reasonableness and necessity
are required.' 171 A commander's application of military necessity is
based on the facts as he knows them at the time of decision, 172 after
sufficient attempts to gain all possible information. 173 Reviewing a
commander's decision, including a determination of what information
he knew and had available to him at the time of the decision, is not
the most effective means of protecting the environment.
Of vital importance in this area, however, is the fact that
174
military necessity is not a justification for violating the law of war.
This is particularly important when considering the value of
differentiating between active and passive environmental warfare.
While the doctrine of military necessity is an important consideration
when a commander considers the passive environmental effects of his
military actions, non de minimus active environmental warfare is a
violation of the law of war per se and could not, therefore, be justified
by the doctrine of military necessity.
When considering the passive environmental effects of warfare,
a commander must balance his proposed actions between the amount
of damage those actions might cause and the necessity of the military
action. Once the results of his actions have reached the GPI standard
of widespread, long-term and severe, he can no longer justify his
actions by military necessity because GPI has set "an absolute ceiling
of permissible destruction" to the environment. 175 "In other words,
once the threshold is reached, the action violates the prescriptions
even if it is militarily necessary and clearly proportional under
traditional balancing tests."'1 7 6 In contrast, active environmental
warfare cannot be justified by military necessity as it violates the law
of war.

Hourcle, supra note 3, at 690.
170.
Richards & Schmitt, supra note 3, at 1076.
171.
172.
See United States v. Wilhelm List et al., XI Trials of War Criminals Before
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1295 (1950)
[hereinafter Wilhelm]; Cohan, supra note 17, at 493 (recounting the acquittal of
German General Lothar Remdulic for destruction of property after initiating a scorched
earth policy in Finmark during World War II).
173.
See Eric T. Jensen, Unexpected Consequences From Knock-On Effects: A
Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INVL L. REV. 1145,

1181-87 (2003) (applying the Court's standard for judging General Rendulic's scorched
earth policy of whether he has given "consideration to all factors and existing
possibilities ... as they appeared to [him] at the time" plus the concept of "feasibility" to
the permissibility of computer network attacks as an exercise of military necessity).
174.
See Wilhelm supra note 172, at 1256.
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Whitaker, supranote 13, at 37.
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Cohan, supranote 17, at 505.
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Attacks in which environmental harm is the primary goal, whether by
forcing an axe against trees which produce fruit or by spraying
defoliants on tropical rainforests from airplanes, has invariably met
with condemnation. Attacks in which damage to the environment is an
unsought consequence of the achievement of some other objective, such
as the impairment of an enemy's ability to produce weapons, has
177
generally been excused on the basis of "military necessity."

Some have argued that there is a danger in minimizing the
application of military necessity in favor of environmental protection.
One commentary rightly asks, "On what grounds can we justify a
categorization that makes humanity less worthy of protection than
the rest of the ecosystem?"1 7 8 The authors pose the hypothetical
situation of international environmental law proscriptions forcing a
commander to "launch an attack through a village rather than
around it to avoid Article 35(3) damage to a large, environmentally
It is likely "that a
fragile area on the village's outskirts." 179
commander would not be expected to sacrifice a soldier to save a
18 0
tree."
Distinguishing between the application of military necessity to
passive and active environmental warfare solves this problem.
Because the destruction of the environmentally protected area to
avoid killing innocent civilians would come under a passive
environmental analysis, the commander would balance military
necessity against the necessity of the action unless he determined
that his actions reached the GPI standard of widespread, long-term,
In contrast, because active environmental
and severe damage.
warfare deals with choices of means and methods of warfare, if the
commander's choice was between an active use of the environment
against the enemy and some other method or means, he could not
rely on military necessity and would be forced to attack some other
way.
Thus, the doctrine of military necessity remains intact for
passive environmental damage, allowing a commander to balance
accomplishing the mission against incidental damage to the
environment until it reaches the standard of widespread, long-term,
and severe damage. But military necessity is no defense to active
environmental damage because it is a violation of the law of war per
se.

177.
178.
179.
180.

Schwabach, supra note 6, at 139.
Richards & Schmitt, supra note 3, at 1088.
Id. at 1084.
Michael D. Diederich, Jr., "Law of War" and Ecology - A Proposal for a

Workable Approach to Protectingthe Environment Through the Law of War, 136 MIL. L.
REV. 137, 157 (1992).
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3. Conclusion
There is an obvious trend in international environmental law to
protect the environment. While numerous international documents
provide protections, there is no clear standard or pattern that
emerges. Though GPI and ENMOD provide standards, their use of
similar language and different application of restraints confuse an
already difficult area of the law. Further, the undifferentiated
application of the doctrine of military necessity to environmental
warfare will lead to false allegations while not providing legitimate
protections. Applying the distinction between active and passive
environmental warfare adds clarity that is greatly needed. ENMOD
began this process but did not go far enough-as Protocol III, CCW,
and subsequent state actions have amply illustrated.
For the
environment to gain the protections it needs to continue so it can
provide sustenance to the human race regardless of armed conflict,
further changes in international law are needed, based on the
distinction between active and passive environmental warfare.

V. THE NEED FOR A CHANGE
All wars are destructive-to people, to countries and to the
environment. That is why the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and
other international laws discourage the worst excesses of armed
conflict, including the targeting of civilians, the mistreatment of
prisoners of war, and the destruction of sensitive infrastructure such as
large dams and nuclear power stations.
However, with the increasingly devastating potential of modern
warfare, it has become apparent that existing international laws do not
fully address the danger that conflict poses to the environment. That
danger takes many forms, including the indiscriminate use of
landmines, the ecological destruction caused by mass movements of
refugees, and the potential devastation threatened by weapons of mass
destruction. While instances in which the environment is deliberately
targeted are relatively few, there remain too many grey areas where
more care could, and should, be exercised to protect the environmental
base on which sustainable development and recovery from conflict
largely depend.
* . . [T]he international community . . . [should] examine how legal
and other mechanisms can be strengthened to encourage environmental
protection in wartime. Ensuring environmental sustainability is not a
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luxury; it is a prerequisite for the future peace and prosperity of our
planet.1

1

There is no doubt that international law is moving in the
direction of greater protection for the environment in all situations,
But this may be a very slow and unguided
including warfare.
An excellent starting point is recognition by the
process.
international community of the distinction between active and
passive environmental damage. If this distinction were written into
future treaties and conventions and discussed openly and fully by
state governments and in United Nations Declarations and
Resolutions, it would quickly become a usable standard by which
environmental damage could be differentiated. Once differentiated,
the appropriate remedies could be tied to specific acts of active and
passive damage and a regimen for enforcement implemented.
Crucial to effective enforcement of international wartime
environmental standards, as shown by the international community's
inability to act after the first Gulf War, is a clear understanding of
what constitutes a violation and how severe that violation is. The
categorization of wartime environmental damage as active or passive
on the international level will be a significant step in that process.

VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
A beginning effort in enhancing the wartime protections for the
environment is the following proposal for a Convention on the
Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict.1 8 2 Although
some have argued for a fifth Geneva Convention, 8 3 this would not be
Two of the hallmarks of the four Geneva
the best solution.
Conventions of 1949 are Articles 2 and 3. These Articles, known as
''common" articles because they are identical in all four Conventions,
define the application of the conventions, making them only
applicable in cases of international armed conflict.' 8 4 Any new
proposal to protect the environment must be fashioned to protect it in

181.
Existing Laws Not Sufficient to Address Danger Posed to Environment by
Conflict, Secretary-GeneralSays in InternationalDay Message, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 6,
2003, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
Richards & Schmitt, supra note 3, at 1089-90 (discussing the problems with
182.
proposing a new convention to protect the environment until the international
community has clarified what it wants the convention to accomplish).
183.
See supra note 9.
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See David Kaye & Steven A. Solomon, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: The
Second Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 922, 925 (2002) (highlighting the fact that the Geneva Conventions apply
more fully to international rather than domestic conflicts as a result of historical trends
and an unwillingness of leaders to give up perceived rights in the domestic context).
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all types of armed conflict, not just those between two states.
Similarly, calls for a Protocol V to the CCW185 would also fall short of
the desired coverage because this convention is also limited in scope
86
to international armed conflict.'
To truly provide the breadth of protection required for the
environment, a new international agreement is necessary. It must
govern all forms of armed conflict' 8 7 and not be subject to
modification or derogation by domestic law. It must be built on the
distinction between passive and active damage to the environment
and confirm the application of existing principles to passive armed
conflict while expanding and clarifying the prohibitions on use of the
environment as a method of armed conflict. Such a convention would
resolve the confusion that currently exists and provide a solid
foundation upon which to build remedies for violations of the law.
The following section is the proposed text for a convention that
will accomplish these purposes. Section B contains a textual analysis
of the proposed convention.
A. Convention on the Protectionof the Environment During Armed
Conflict
The High Contracting Parties,
Recognizing the unique nature of the environment and the universal
human reliance upon the environment for continued existence,
Recalling Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the World Charter for
Nature, and Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration from the 1992 United
Nations Conference on the Environment,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The purpose of this Convention is to protect the environment during
times of armed conflict.
Article 2: Definitions
For purposes of this Convention, the following definitions apply:
1.
Active Environmental Warfare: the intentional
environment as a weapon of waging armed conflict.

use of the

2. Armed Conflict: any conflict as defined in Articles 2 or 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

185.
See supra note 9.
186.
See LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 46, at 180.
187.
See Parsons, supra note 3, at 444-45 (arguing that as technology changes
the nature of warfare, the world must unify to ward against the increased potential for
environmental calamity).
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3. Passive Environmental Warfare: acts not specifically designed to use
the environment for a particular military purpose but that have a
degrading effect on the environment.
4. Sustainable Environment: those aspects of the natural environment
necessary to sustain itself, including the continued existence of all
forms of human, animal, and plant life.
Article 3: Oblig'ations
Each State Party to the Convention undertakes, during times of armed
conflict, to:
1. Not engage in active environmental warfare that will damage the
sustainable environment.
2. Not engage in passive environmental warfare that will result in
widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment.
Article 4: Implementation
Each State Party to the Convention agrees to implement fully and
expeditiously domestic laws and military regulations that will ensure
understanding and compliance with the provisions of this Convention.

B. Textual Analysis
The Preamble refers to some of the prior United Nations
statements on protections for the environment. The initial statement
recognizes both the intrinsic and anthropocentric views of valuing the
environment.
Article 1 states the overall purpose of the Convention. For the
Convention to achieve its purpose, it must apply to armed conflict
generally, not simply international armed conflict. The acceptance as
customary law of the "no harm" principle, and in particular its
relevance to armed conflict in the Corfu Channel case discussed
above,18 8 make this the necessary application of the Convention.
Article 2 contains definitions that apply to the Convention.
While some of these definitions may seem broad, particularly the
natural environment and sustainable environment, this is done
intentionally. In this case, greater detail may serve to limit the
Convention's initial usefulness.18 9 The principles are sufficiently
clear, and state practice will fill in the nuances over time.
The definitions of active and passive environmental warfare
have been discussed at great length above. 190 The use of the term
warfare may initially appear problematic because the Convention
applies to all forms of armed conflict, not just traditional war
between two states. As it is used here, it is not a comment on the

188.
189.
190.

See supra note 67.
Parsons, supra note 3, at 467.
See supra Part III.
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type of conflict, but rather on the type of employment. The use of the
term warfare in this Convention limits these terms to the application
between belligerents or other hostile forces in armed conflict.
The definition of Armed Conflict is meant to coincide with
Pictet's commentary to the Geneva conventions1 9 1 and is meant to
have the same understanding given therein.
The definition of sustainable environment is meant to be broadly
inclusive. As written, there could be instances in which active
environmental warfare damaged the natural environment but did not
damage the sustainable environment. This gap is deliberate. Not all
intentional uses of the environment as a weapon are proscribed.
Uses that do not affect the sustainable environment would be of such
minor import that they would not violation the Convention. The
foundation of the proscription on damaging the sustainable
environment is found in the second sentence of Article 55 of GPI as
analyzed previously.
The actual restrictions of the Convention are stated in Article 3.
They rely heavily on the definitions as described in this Article. The
intention of the Convention is still to apply the GPI standard to
passive environmental warfare as found in the first sentence of
Article 55 and allow the de minimus exception of the second sentence
of Article 55 to active environmental warfare. 192 Some commentators
have urged that intentional damage to the environment ought to be
But tying the quantum portion of the
prohibited per se. 193
prohibition to the sustainable environment is a much better
compromise between the intrinsic value approach and the
It is also founded on the current
anthropocentric approach.
principles of international law, such as Articles 54 and 55 of Protocol
1.194

VII. CONCLUSION
Environmental warfare, both active and passive, is a part of
The Stockholm International Peace Research
modern warfare.
Institute has concluded that as the technology of weapons has
increased, the number of munitions used to kill an enemy soldier has

191.
See COMMENTARY, supra note 130, at 35-36 (advocating a wide application
of an extensive ist of criteria attempting to distinguish "a genuine armed conflict from
a mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection").
Yuzon, supra note 3, at 843.
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Drumbl, supra note 3, at 143.
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Richards & Schmitt, supra note 3, at 1069; Schmitt, Environmental Law of
War, supra note 25, at 256; Yuzon, supra note 3, at 817-23.
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likewise increased. This led to the conclusion that the amount of
19 5
environmental damage caused in warfare is also escalating.
Gulf War I has amply illustrated the difficulties of holding a
state responsible for environmental damage caused during warfare
A well-recognized
under the current effects-based paradigm.
differentiation between active and passive environmental warfare,
and an understanding of its application, will help solidify the
standards of state responsibility and provide increased protection for
the environment.
The lower threshold for breaching international environmental
law when engaged in active environmental warfare will lead to
heightened state liability and will preclude commanders from
weaponizing the environment. This, in turn, will give the world
community greater legal impetus for holding violating states
individually liable and increase the legal basis for enforcement of
international obligations. This increase in legal enforcement will
draw the line of acceptable behavior a little closer to ensuring a
protected environment.

195.
See STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Warfare in a
Fragile World: Military Impact on the Human Environment, 4 (1980) (hypothesizing an
increase in environmental harm caused by an apparent shift in military targets from
concentrated target bombing to less defined area bombing).

